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Crossley: Rescuing Baby Doe

RESCUING
RESCUING BABY
BABY DOE
DOE
Crossley·
Mary Crossley*
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

The
The twenty-fifth
twenty-fifth anniversary
anniversary of the Baby
Baby Doe Rules
Rules offers a
changed during
during the
valuable opportunity
opportunity to reflect on how much has changed
valuable
past two-and-one-half
two-and-one-half decades and how much has stayed
stayed the same, at
past
least in situations when parents and physicians
physicians face the birth of an
infant who
who comes into the
the world with its life
life in peril.
medical
advances in the treatment
The most salient
salient changes
changes are
are the medical advances
treatment
of premature
premature infants and the changes
changes in social attitudes
attitudes towards
towards and
legal protections
protections for people with disabilities. The threshold
threshold at which
which a
advanced
prematurely
prematurely delivered
delivered infant is considered
considered viable has advanced
steadily earlier into pregnancy, and the interventions
interventions developed
developed to
steadily
ameliorate
premature delivery have become more-but
ameliorate the effects of premature
not fully-effective,
fully-effective, as discussed
discussed by other
other symposium
symposium participants.
participants.
During the same
same period, Congress
Congress passed the Americans with
(ADA)',I , providing individuals
Disabilities Act (ADA)
individuals with disabilities with
protection against discrimination, and it recently reaffirmed
broad protection
reaffirmed its
intent that the ADA be broadly construed in the ADA Amendments
Amendments
2
Act of 2008.
2008.2 Despite the advances in medical treatment and in legal
protections for and societal attitudes regarding people with
disabilities, however, the law regarding treatment decisions for
for
remarkably static.
newborns with disabilities has remained
remained remarkably
twenty-five years in neonatal medicine
Changes in the past twenty-five
medicine and in
in
led
to
regarding disability
disability have
the legal and social discourse regarding
increased
increased complexity
complexity in teasing out how medical treatment choices at
the beginning of life implicate disability concerns.
concerns. This Essay
complexity and how it relates to the
describes
describes that increased
increased complexity
I owe thanks
thanks to
to Nick
Nick
Pittsburgh School
Law. lowe
of Law,
Law, University
University of
of Pittsburgh
Dean and
and Professor
Professor of
•* Dean
School of
of Law.
Cassell
Cassell for his valuable
valuable research assistance.
amended by ADA
ADA
12101-12213 (2006),
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
\.
(2006), amended
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553-3559
3553-3559 (2008).
L. No. 110-325,
Amendments
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. 1.
110-325, 122 Stat. 3553-3354 (2008).
2. ADA
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
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of the
disability concerns that originally prompted the enactment of
Baby
Doe
Rules.
It
will
then
proceed
to
suggest how analogizing
analogizing
Baby
suggest
these decisions to rescue situations might inform our thinking about
these
how to give
give disability concerns their due. The Essay will close by
how
Baby Doe Rules as part of
of
suggesting that a richer conception of the Baby
child
welfare
law
may
help
us
child
law
situate a role that disability advocacy
might play in influencing-if not controlling-how these complex
situations unfold. The Essay's purpose is not to provide answers to
situations
the questions that vex medical providers about the legal limits on
parental and provider decision-making, but simply to offer a
perspective on the nature of the questions we should ask.
I. INCREASED MEDICAL COMPLEXITY AND THE BABY DOE RULES

Beginning with a brief recap of how disability concerns played a
Beginning
central role in the passage of the Baby Doe Rules is in order. In 1982
the national news media picked up the story of an infant in Indiana,
referred
referred to simply as Baby Doe. 3 The newborn
newborn had been diagnosed as
having Down syndrome
and
as
suffering
life-threatening
syndrome
from a life-threatening
blockage
of
its
digestive
tract.
Although
the
latter
condition
could be
blockage.
Although
surgery
easily corrected by surgery, the parents chose not to have the surgery
performed, and as a result the infant died in less than a week.
The portrayal
portrayal of an infant being
being permitted
permitted to starve
starve to death,
apparently
because
it
had
Down
syndrome,
prompted
a public outcry.
apparently
Down
The Reagan
Reagan Administration
Administration responded initially by promulgating
promulgating
regulations that treated
treated hospitals'
hospitals' failure to provide life-saving
life-saving
treatment
to
infants
with
handicaps
as
a
violation
of
of section
section 504 of
of
treatment
handicaps
4 which prohibits discrimination
the Rehabilitation
Act
of
1973,
on
the
Rehabilitation
1973,4 which prohibits discrimination
basis
basis of
of handicap
handicap by
by recipients
recipients of federal
federal funding. To make a long
long
story short, this initial
deeming selective
selective non-treatment
non-treatment
initial approach
approach of deeming
to be a form of disability
disability discrimination
discrimination was
was struck
struck down
down because,
because,
although
the
hospitals
where
disabled
infants
were
born
were
although the hospitals
disabled infants
born were subject
subject
3.
3. See
See John
John A.
A. Robertson,
Robertson, Extreme
Extreme Prematurity
Prematurity and
and Parental
Parental Rights
Rights after Baby
Baby Doe,
Doe, HASTINGS
HASTINGS
CENTER
CENTER REP.,
REp., July-Aug. 2004,
2004, at
at 33.
33.
4.
4. 29
29 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 794
794 (2006).
(2006).
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to section 504's anti-discrimination
anti-discrimination mandate, it was the parents-not
parents-not
the hospitals-who
hospitals-who made the decision
decision whether to authorize
authorize the
55
anti-discrimination law did
surgery or other treatment. The federal anti-discrimination
not apply to parents'
parents' decisions.
In a second and more enduring effort to craft a legal response to
parents' treatment decisions
Baby Doe's case, Congress set limits on parents'
by amending
amending federal child welfare laws that conditioned federal
funding on state child welfare
agencies' carrying out certain
welfare agencies'
certain federally
198466
of 1984
Amendments
Abuse Amendments of
mandated
mandated responsibilities. The
The Child
Child Abuse
are the Baby Doe Rules still in force today.
The essence of the disability rights case against permitting
selective non-treatment
non-treatment in a case like Baby Doe's is straightforward.
The choice not to treat that infant was based on the fact that the life
life
certainly be a life with a disability. The medical
saved would certainly
contained clear evidence
literature contained
evidence that many
many doctors thought such
choices appropriate
because
of
the
perceived
perceived low quality of life with
appropriate because
7
presumably the medical treatment choices of parents
a disability, and presumably
were influenced
influenced by this professional
professional devaluing of life with physical
and cognitive impairments.
Today, the area of greater challenge
challenge involves medical decisions for
of viability. 8 Part of the
infants born very prematurely, at the margins ofviability.8
challenge
challenge is to determine how the Baby Doe Rules should be
of
interpreted to apply to these situations as a legal matter. But part of
5.
610-11, 630 (1986).
5. Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 610--11,
(1986). In Bowen, a plurality of the
Court held that the Department of Health
Health and Human Services failed to justify
justify the need for such
regulations because the agency had not shown that hospitals were withholding
withholding medical treatment from
"otherwise
Id. at 630. Because parents must consent
"otherwise qualified" infants. Id.
consent to surgery or other treatment
before
before medical
medical providers could
could provide
provide it, a lack of parental consent
consent meant that disabled
disabled infants were
not "otherwise qualified"
qualified" to receive treatment
treatment and were not denied care
care "solely by reason of his
handicap."
handicap." Id.
Id. For a criticism of this reasoning, see
see Leslie
Leslie Pickering Francis
Francis &
& Anita Silvers,
(Mis)framing
as Discrimination
Discriminationagainst
(Mis)framing Schiavo
Schiavo as
against Persons
Persons with Disabilities,
Disabilities, 61 U. MIAMI
MIAMI L. REv. 789,
797 (2007).
(2007).
6. Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (codified
(2006).
(codified as amended
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106i)
5101-5106i)(2006).
7. See,
See, e.g., Raymond S. Duff & A.G.M.
SpecialAO.M. Campbell, Moral and Ethical
Ethical Dilemmas
Dilemmas in the SpecialCare
NEw ENG.
(1973); Anthony
al., Ethical
Issues in
in Pediatric
Care Nursery,
Nursery, 289 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 890,
890, 893 (1973);
Anthony Shaw et aI.,
Ethical Issues
Pediatric
Surgery: A
A National
NationalSurvey ofPediatricians
PediatriciansandPediatric
(1977).
Surgery:
Pediatric Surgeons,
Surgeons, 60 PEDIATRICS 588 (1977).
8. See,
See, e.g., Robertson,
A. Sayeed, The Marginally
Robertson, supra
supra note 3.
3. See generally
generally Sadath
Sadath A
Marginally Viable
Newborn: Legal Challenges,
Challenges, Conceptual
Inadequacies, and
and Reasonableness,
J. L. MED. &
& ETHIcs
Newborn:
Conceptual Inadequacies,
Reasonableness, 34 1.
ETHICS
600 (2006).
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challenge is to discern how disability concerns are implicated
the challenge
implicated in
these situations,
situations, and this Essay will focus on that question.
As a factual and prognostic
prognostic matter, important
important distinctions
distinctions exist
between
the
original
paradigmatic
case
of
selective
non-treatment of
between
original paradigmatic
selective non-treatment
of
disabled newborns and situations involving very premature
premature
physicians
newborns. In a case like Baby Doe's, the parents and physicians
knew at the time of the non-treatment
non-treatment decision that the infant, if he or
or
she survived, would survive
survive with a lasting disability whose nature, if
if
not extent, was known. The treatment at issue was known to be
effective in ameliorating a life-threatening
life-threatening condition,
effective
condition, but would not
disability-producing impairment. In short, if the parents
eliminate the disability-producing
9
known disability.
the infant will
treat,
to
choose
will survive
survive with
with aa known
disability.9
As several of the presentations at this symposium highlight,
confidence in cases involving
however, prognostic confidence
involving extremely
extremely
lo
0
premature
less.' In
premature newborns is substantially less.
In many cases,
cases, it is
uncertain
uncertain whether the infant will survive even
even if treatment is
provided. If the infant does survive, it may survive with little or no
cognitive functioning, or it may
long-term deficit in physical
physical or cognitive
survive with physical or mental impairments
impairments that are moderate
moderate or
severe. Moreover, physicians
physicians and parents cannot forecast with any
degree
of
certainty
how prolonged, invasive, and painful the course
degree
of treatment will be to produce
produce this uncertain outcome. In short, if
may or may not survive, and if the
treatment is provided, the infant mayor
infant does survive, it may do so with no disability
disability or with a mild,
moderate, or severe
disability
that
may
be
either
physical or cognitive
severe
in nature. This extreme
of
extreme prognostic uncertainty changes the nature of
concerns are
parental decision making and changes how disability concerns
implicated.
parents' refusal to consent
In the original Baby Doe scenario, the parents'
to treatment
treatment that in all likelihood they would have consented to as a
9. Admittedly, this statement
statement overstates the certainty
certainty of any prognosis; the point is simply that
archetypal Baby Doe scenario were
parents in
in the archetypal
were presented with
with a choice whose implications
implications seemed
clear.
supra note 8,
marginally viable newborns as presenting
10. See Sayeed, supra
8, at 600 (referring to marginally
presenting
"unparalleled uncertainty about outcomes").
"unparalleled
outcomes").
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matter of course
course if their infant had not been identified as having a
disability appears
appears clearly to have been discrimination
discrimination based on
on
disability, whether legally proscribed
proscribed or not. To the extent the nontreatment decision was influenced
influenced by societal and medical biases
misperceptions regarding
toward people with disabilities and misperceptions
regarding the
disabilities
quality of the lived experience enjoyed by people with disabilities
and their families, it seems like the kind of disability discrimination
discrimination
that our society recognizes as objectionable.
objectionable.
The concerns
concerns from the disability perspective look a bit different in
cases of extreme prematurity. For one thing, categorizing infants born
at the margins of viability as being disabled is itself questionable.
significant risk of being
certainly at significant
These infants, if they survive, are certainly
disabled, but their future disability is by no means certain. At the time
that decisions must initially be made, everything about their future is
uncertain."lII
speculative
speculative and uncertain.
As a matter of strict legal definition, an infant delivered at twentythree to twenty-four weeks
weeks may well fall within the ADA's definition
defmition
of "individual
disability" by virtue of having an impairment
impairment
"individual with a disability"
or
that significantly
significantly limits a major life activity, such as seeing or
12
12
breathing. It seems likely, however, that it is not the impairments
and
existing at the time of delivery that actually give pause to parents and
physicians deciding whether to provide resuscitative and subsequent
subsequent
treatment to marginally viable newborns. Instead, it is the prospect
that the prematurity could result in one or more disabilities thatthatperhaps together with other factors-may lead parents to consider
withholding treatment. So, parents seem likely to be influenced more
existence of
of
by the expectation
expectation of possible disability than the existence
disability, as in the original Baby Doe case.
11.
II. Of course, if initial resuscitation and treatment
treatment are provided, over
over time the contours of an
extremely premature
anticipated disabilities
premature infant's anticipated
disabilities may become
become clearer and more
more definite. This
change the nature of disability concerns implicated in a single case.
evolution may change
12.
particularly likely in light of Congress's
Congress's
12. 42 U.S.C.
u.s.c. §§ 12102(2XA)
12102(2XA) (2006). This conclusion is particularly
definition in the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008 to include within
revisions of the statutory
statutory definition
ADA Amendments
within the
the
"major life activity"
activity" the "operation
function," including
definition of "major
"operation of
ofaa major bodily function,"
including neurological and
respiratory functions, and to make clear that the definition
defmition of disability should be construed broadly. Id.
Id
§ 12102(2)(8),
12102(2)(B), (4XA).
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The other, more subtle point that strikes me is that decisions about
extremely premature
end-of-life decisions
an extremely
premature newborn
newborn seem less like end-of-life
than beginning-of-life
beginning-of-life decisions. Without stepping
stepping into the morass of
of
"life" begins as a constitutional
questions about when "life"
constitutional or
philosophical
philosophical matter, framing the question as involving the beginning
of the infant's experience
experience of
life may remove
oflife
remove it some from the core of
of
disability concerns. The central motivating force behind the passage
of the ADA and the disability rights movement
movement has been improving
improving
the lived experience
experience of persons with disabilities. Demanding that
medical
interventions
reinforce whatever
whatever fragile wisps
medical interventions be provided to reinforce
of sustainable
sustainable life a marginally viable newborn
newborn presents at birth
arguably
commitment to preserving
arguably has more to do with a vitalist's commitment
preserving
all life than with a disability rights advocate's
advocate's agenda.
Let me hasten to say that, by pointing out that decisions about
premature infants do not present the paradigmatic
paradigmatic
treatment for very premature
disability discrimination scenario,
scenario, I do not mean to suggest a lack of
of
concern about how bias might operate in this setting to diminish
concern
opportunities and welfare for people with disabilities. But the
opportunities
immense complexity
complexity of the issues presented by the birth of a
marginally viable newborn requires us to consider the potential for
bias thoughtfully.
II. RESCUING
MARGINALLY VIABLE NEWBORN
REsCUING THE MARGINALLY

Might a different perspective
perspective on the question offer some fresh
insights? Some commentators
interventions
commentators describe
describe the medical interventions
responding
to
the
birth
of
a
marginally
viable
newborn
as a rescue
responding
13
operation of sorts.
operation
sortS.13 The newborn
newborn emerges from the womb in
immediate
immediate peril, and all is lost unless the medical team steps in in an
effort to achieve
achieve a healthy outcome in spite of long odds. The
question is whether
whether a rescue effort is compulsory.

"the odds-against opportunity to rescue"
13. See, e.g.,
e.g., Sayeed, supra note 8, at 607 (referring to ''the
rescue" that
medical
"decisions not to initiate rescue").
rescue").
medical technology offers for marginally viable newborns and to "decisions
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Looking at two different aspects of our societal response to rescues
may be informative. First, when in general terms does a legal duty to
rescue another person in peril arise? Second, what role does the socalled "rescue
"rescue imperative"
imperative" play in the scenarios presented by
extremely premature births?
extremely
A principle of tort law that first-year law students learn is the "no
duty to rescue"
rescue" rule, which basically
basically means that an individual has no
duty, enforceable
enforceable by a claim in tort law, to take actions to assist
another who is in harm's way.14
way. 14 To give a graphic
graphic example, I have no
legal duty to pull the playing
playing toddler from the railroad
railroad tracks, even if
I could do so without any risk of harm
myself.
harm to myself.
But like most rules, the "no
"no duty to rescue" rule has its exceptions.
The contours of these exceptions are not precise, but they are often
based on the existence of relationships that impose some kind of
of
15
duty. 15 Sometimes
Sometimes a duty is founded on professional
professional relationships,
relationships,
such as the established relationship between
between doctor and patient, while
another time the basis may be a familial relationship, like the parentchild relationship. Thus, courts
courts have found that a parent
parent may have a
duty to take reasonable
reasonable steps to protect her child from harm at the
16
and that principle can logically be extended
hands of a third party,
party,16
to require a parent to take steps to rescue her child in a health or
or
accident-related emergency situation.
accident-related
That duty's extent, however, is not unbounded, as parents will not
be required to place themselves in grave danger to come to their
parents' duty is instead cabined
cabined
children's rescue. The extent of the parents'
by the concept
concept of reasonableness,
reasonableness, as is so often the case with the law.
reasonablesteps to rescue their children from harm
Parents must take reasonable
14. Kaho'ohanohano v. Dep't of Human
("The general rule is
Human Servs.,
Servs., 178 P.3d 538, 563 (Haw. 2008)
2008) (''The
that a person does not have a duty to act affirmatively
affinnatively to protect another
another person from harm. The fact that
the actor realizes
realizes or should realize that action on his or her part is necessary for another's aid or
action.") (citing Lee v.
protection does not of itself impose upon him or her a duty to take such action.")
Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (Haw. 1996».
1996)).
15. Id.
'special relationship'
relationship' exists between
15.
[d. ("The
(''The exceptions
exceptions to this general rule...
rule ... arise when a 'special
between the
actor and the individual facing harm.")
1996)).
harm.") (citing Lee v. Corregedore,
Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 329 (Haw. 1996».
(N.C. 1982) (holding that the parent-child
16. See,
See. e.g., State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780,
780, 785-86 (N.C.
relationship confers
confers a duty upon a parent to rescue a child when he or she is in peril); People v. Rolon,
1206, 1215-19 (2008).
160 Cal. App. 4th 1206,
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or risk being
being held civilly and even
even criminally
criminally liable for the
the resulting
resulting
7
harm. 17
harm.'
While
While American
American law
law does
does not impose
impose aa general
general duty to rescue on
on
individuals,
of rescue"
rescue"
individuals, scholars
scholars have recognized
recognized that aa so-called
so-called "rule
"rule of
"rescue imperative"
imperative" in fact often motivates
motivates a collective
collective rescue
or "rescue
"rule"
effort to save the lives of identified
identified individuals
individuals in peril. This
This "rule"
extensive resources
society's willingness
willingness to devote
devote extensive
resources to
highlights our society's
identifiable individuals, even
even if we are not collectively
collectively willing
willing
rescue identifiable
generally from encountering
to devote resources
resources to protect
protect people generally
encountering a
risk in the first place.'
contrast often drawn is between
between the money
money
place. 188 A contrast
spent
spent and
and lives risked
risked to rescue trapped
trapped miners by a society
society unwilling
unwilling
significant resources
resources to enforce mine safety
safety regulations
regulations
to devote significant
in
health
care
occurs
phenomenon
accidents.
The
meant to prevent
prevent
phenomenon
settings as well, where the contrast
contrast is drawn
drawn between
between the
the· sense of
of
chance" therapies that might
obligation to provide expensive,
expensive, "last
"last chance"
preventive care may
save an individual's life, even when funding for preventive
19
be limited.
limited!9
So do these
these two perspectives
perspectives on rescue offer any fresh insights for
incorporating
incorporating disability concerns into how we think about
about marginally
marginally
about the provision
provision of medical
viable newborns?
newborns? If we think about
affect how
how
treatment to these infants as a species of rescue, does that affect
we view the obligation to provide treatment
treatment that the Baby Doe rules
mandate?
seem broadly to mandate?
rescue" as reflecting
"rule of rescue"
Discussions
Discussions often describe
describe the "rule
reflecting a
commitment to saving individual
individual life regardless
regardless of cost. In other
rescue, cost poses no limit to the rescue
words, under the rule of rescue,
20 By
By contrast, in the exceptional
exceptional cases when a legal duty to
efforts. 20
rescue is recognized, its extent is limited by the concept
concept of
of
17. Walden, 293 S.E.2d at 786.
Prioritiesin Oregon:
Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets the
Health Care
Care Priorities
18. See David C. Hadom, Setting Health
of
AssOc. 2218,2218-19
2218, 2218-19 (1991).
Rule o/Rescue,
ofRescue, 265 J. AM. MED. Assoc.
(1991). Cf M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention
Invention 0/
(discussing the tension between
(2003) (discussing
Health
304-06 (2003)
between the rule of rescue and
REV. 247, 304-06
Law, 91 CAL.
CAL. L. REv.
Health Law,
the ''pursuit
"pursuit of population-wide health maximization").
Health Care
Care
CaringSociety Do Health
Can a Just
and Caring
Therapies: Can
Chance Therapies:
Cf. Leonard
Leonard M. Fleck, Last Chance
19. Cf
Just and
255,275-76
POL'Y L.
L. &
& ETHICS
ETHiCS 255,
YALE J. HEALTH POL'y
ItselfIs
at Stake?,
Stake?, 2 YALEJ.
Rationing When Life Itself
Is at
275-76 (2002).
20. Id.
Id. at 275.
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reasonableness. On first glance, both these points might suggest that
reasonableness.
providing treatment to rescue
rescue extremely premature newborns would
uncontroversial and obligatory. After all, the rescue attempt poses
be uncontroversial
poses
intervening during a
danger to the parents (as intervening
no risk of physical danger
"rescue imperative"
imperative"
physical attack on the child might) and under the "rescue
the cost of treatment is irrelevant.
What seems to blunt the rescue imperative, however, are concerns
about the very real possibility of future disability if the rescue attempt
generally
produces a survivor. The risk of disabled rescuees does not generally
make it into public discourse about whether to engage in rescue
rescuee-whether a miner trapped
efforts, even though it seems
seems that a rescuee-whether
trapped
in a mine or a child who has fallen down a well-may
well-may sometimes
sometimes
suffer an accident-related
accident-related disability after a successful rescue effort.
We don't say that we shouldn't try to rescue the trapped miner
because he may end up disabled
disabled if we do get him out. By contrast, the
centrally in discussions about
anticipation of future disability features centrally
whether medical interventions are mandatory, optional, or futile for
marginally viable newborns.
This suggests that the "rule of rescue"--the
rescue"-the moral imperative to try
to save lives regardless of cost-is
cost-is less robust in cases involving
marginally viable newborns because the specter
of
specter of a lifetime of
disability blunts that imperative. If that is the case, then perhaps these
cases resemble the original Baby Doe case more closely than I
suggested
suggested earlier. Maybe
Maybe the decisions
decisions in these cases
cases really are
primarily about disability, even though the decision makers cannot
forecast with certainty the existence, nature, or extent of future
disability. If so, perhaps
perhaps the law is justified
justified in prohibiting
prohibiting parental
terms-would prefer
choices that-in blunt terms-would
prefer to accept infant death
over the possibility of a disabled child.
I am skeptical, though, that the dynamics
dynamics in these cases can be
of
reduced to such stark terms, and returning to the law's treatment
treatment of
the parental
parental duty to rescue proves helpful here. Recall that while the
law imposes a duty on parents to act to protect their children
children from
harm, parents are legally required
required only to take reasonable
reasonable steps to
rescue their offspring. And the modifier of reasonableness
reasonableness requires
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considering
parents' decisions.
considering the full context of the parents'
The dangers that attempted rescue poses for the parents are relevant,
and logically
attempted rescue poses for the
logically so are the dangers that attempted
infant itself and for other children in the family as well. So, to
illustrate the broader concept, the law might recognize some kind of
of
duty on the part of a parent who can swim to dive into a lake to try to
rescue her toddler who has fallen from a boat. It is less clear, though,
that the parent would have a duty to dive in if doing so meant leaving
More controversially, beyond the
another toddler alone on the boat. More
risks of physical danger to self and others, one could argue that
parents'
parents' duty to rescue might be limited by risks of significant
significant
emotional or financial
financial harm attendant
attendant on the rescue attempt.
If we look at parents'
parents' duty to rescue
rescue an extremely premature
newborn
through
this
lens,
the
question
of what "reasonable"
newborn
"reasonable" rescue
attempts the law should require looks more complex. Moreover,
Moreover, the
reasonableness
reasonableness of rescue
rescue attempts would be decided
decided on a case-bycase basis in light of all surrounding circumstances.
circumstances. The Baby Doe
Rules, however, explicitly reject a contextualized,
contextualized, case-by-case
case-by-case
2211
approach
to
parents'
treatment
choices.
In
that
rejection
approach parents'
rejection they depart
not only from the tort rules regarding
regarding rescue to which I am
analogizing
of
analogizing them; they also reject the principles
principles of the very body of
law in which they are embedded. And they do so in a way that may
ultimately detract from the flourishing of people with disabilities.
LAW
III. THE BABY DOE RULES AND CHILD WELFARE
WELFARE LAW

Often ignored in discussions
discussions of the Baby Doe Rules is the larger
body of law of which they are a part, namely child welfare law.
incorporate in their laws
Specifically, the Rules require states to incorporate
regarding
regarding child abuse and neglect
neglect provisions for responding to
instances of medical neglect, defined to include non-treatment
non-treatment of
of
disabled
infants.22 Like the Baby Doe Rules, child welfare
disabled infants.22
welfare laws more
21.
U.S.C. § 5106i(b)
21. Cf.
Cf. 42
42 U.S.C.
5106i(b) (2006).
22. ld
Id. § a(b)(2)(B).
a(b)(2)(B).
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generally set limits
limits on
on parents'
parents' treatment
treatment of their children.
children. And
And if
if
generally
parents act in ways that fall within
within a state's
state's definition
definition of child abuse
abuse
parents
protect the
the child.
or neglect,
neglect, the
the state
state can intervene
intervene to protect
or
In defining
defining what
what parental
parental conduct
conduct will be considered
considered abusive
abusive or
or
of
neglectful, however, states must legislate with an awareness
awareness of
neglectful,
constitutional limits on
on their
their authority in this realm. Courts have
have
constitutional
recognized
Constitution protects
protects parents'
parents' rights to make
recognized that the
the U.S. Constitution
upbringing, decisions
children's
their
regarding
important
decisions
regarding
children's
decisions
decisions
important
with schooling,
schooling, religious
religious training, medical
medical care,
care, and
that deal with
23
23
of
constitutional right of
discipline, among other
other matters . This constitutional
"parental
autonomy"
is
part
of
a
broader
right
of
family
privacy
"parental autonomy" is part of a broader
privacy or
or
24 It is premised
understanding that, because
integrity.24
premised on an understanding
because
family integrity.
parents generally
generally seek to act in the best interests of their children,
substantial discretion in making
they should enjoy substantial
making decisions for their
necessary to protect the
only when necessary
interfering
children, with the state interfering
25
significant harm.
harm?5
child from a significant
This is the framework under
under which most cases
cases of alleged medical
generally have the authority to make
neglect are handled. Parents generally
consent
decisions for their minor children, but if they fail or refuse to consent
decisions
long-term
to a treatment
treatment needed
needed to prevent their child's
child's death or long-term
intervene, 26 typically by taking custody of
of
disability, the state may intervene,26
authorizing treatment. An
the child for the limited purpose of authorizing
example is when a court orders a life-saving
life-saving blood transfusion for the
example
27 In
in
proscribe transfusions. 27
child of parents whose religious beliefs proscribe
"easy" cases: the treatment
some senses, these are the "easy"
treatment is a one-time
intervention with known efficacy and few risks, so it is easy for the

65-66 (2000).
Granville, 530
530 U.S. 57, 65-{;6
23. Troxel
23.
Troxel v.v. Granville,
(2000).
andCarhart, 48
24. See generally
generally David D.
D. Meyer,
Meyer, Lochner
Lochner Redeemed: Family
Family Privacy
Privacy After Troxel and
UCLA L. REv. 1125 (2001).
UCLAL.REv.1l25(2001).
(1979) (explaining and referring to the "traditional
442 U.S.
U.S. 584,602,604
584, 602, 604 (1979)
Parham v.
v. J.R., 442
Cf. Parham
25. Cj
presumption that the parents act in the best interests of their
their child").
child").
Tensions
Children: Tensions
Making for
Decision Making
26. See generally
generally Walter Wadlington, Medical
Medical Decision
for and by Children:
(1994).
REv. 311
311 (1994).
Child, 1994
1994 U.
U. ILL. L. REv.
State, and Child,
between Parent,
Parent,State.
between
27. See,
See, e.g., Crouse Irving Mem'l
Mem'l Hosp.,
Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
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state to step in, protect the child, and then step back out of the
28
picture.28
intervention into
Courts seem less inclined to support the state's intervention
family privacy when the stakes are lower for the child or when the
proposed treatment's benefits
benefits are less clear. For example, one case
case
three-year-old
child,
who
had
been
involved parents
who
placed
their
parents
been
non-Hodgkins lymphoma, in the care of a Christian
diagnosed with non-Hodgkins
chemotherapy
Science practitioner
practitioner rather than consenting to the chemotherapy
estimated
chemotherapy was estimated
recommended by a doctor. Because
recommended
Because the chemotherapy
the
risk of
of
chance of success and carried
with
it
to have only a 40% chance
carried
significant side effects, the court found an insufficient
insufficient basis for the
determine their child's
child's
state to override the parents'
parents' right to determine
treatment, even though doctors predicted
predicted that the child would die
29
without medical treatment. 29
parents'
Cases like this one highlight the delicate balancing
balancing of the parents'
constitutionally
constitutionally protected
protected right to make medical
medical decisions for their
children
children against the state's interest in protecting
protecting a child from serious
interventionist authority in
harm. It bears
bears emphasis
emphasis that the state's interventionist
is
limited
to
protecting
child neglect proceedings
proceedings
protecting children from
serious harm; the state cannot override
override parental judgment simply
simply
because it would
would reach a different conclusion about what is "best"
"best" for
30
reasonable option is available. 3o
the child when more than one reasonable
So
of
minimally
acceptable
understood, child neglect laws set a floor
acceptable
generally establish a bright line rule
behavior for parents
parents but do not generally
about what parents must provide
provide their children. For better or worse,
child welfare
welfare laws often contain standards
standards that are vague and that
leave discretion
discretion in the hands of child welfare
welfare social workers and
Arnand H.
28. I1 use quotation marks
marks for "easy"
"easy" because these cases are anything but. See generally
generally Armand
State
Witnesses, Roman Catholicism,
Catholicism, and
and Neo-Calvinism:
Neo-Calvinism: Religion
Religion and
and State
M. Antommaria,
Antommaria, Jehovah
Jehovah's's Witnesses,
& FAM. STuD.
Intervention in Parental,
Intervention
Parental, Medical
Medical Decision
Decision Making,
Making, 8 J. L. &
STUD. 293 (2006)
(2006) (arguing
(arguing that
de-rationalize and thus marginalize parents'
parents' religious beliefs).
courts and bioethicists
bioethicists de-rationalize
29. Newmark
Newmark v. Williams,
Williams, 588 A.2d 1108
1108 (Del. 1991).
1991).
Troxel, where the Court held
30. The Supreme
Supreme Court made this point in a different
different context in Troxel,
held
grandparents' visitation with their grandchildren
unconstitutional
unconstitutional a court's ordering of grandparents'
grandchildren over the
objections of the children's mother. The Court observed that "the
"the Due Process Clause does not permit a
State to infringe on the fundamental
fundamental right of parents
parents to make child rearing decisions simply because
because a
'better' decision could be made."
made." 530 U.S.
state judge believes a 'better'
U.S. at 72-73.
72-73.
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courts as to how the laws apply to the facts of a particular
particular family's
family's
welfare laws look pretty different from the
life.331' In short, most child welfare
non-treatment
Baby Doe Rules, which characterize
characterize a broad group of non-treatment
specific
decisions as medical neglect unless they fall into one of three specific
categories and provide neither parents nor child
(though not precise)
precise) categories
32
discretion. 32
welfare workers with
with discretion.
-despite their
What the Baby Doe Rules do not recognize
recognize -despite
death-dealing medical decisions
laudable efforts to guard against death-dealing
life
based on bias and stereotypes
stereotypes regarding the value and quality of life
with a disability-is
that
they
are
in
tension
with
a
competing
good:
disability-is
the value of parental autonomy in making decisions regarding
regarding their
magnified in cases
children and their families. This tension is magnified
involving marginally
marginally viable newborns because of the uncertainty and
complexity
complexity their cases entail.
Baby
Value may flow from harmonizing our understanding of the Baby
welfare law, even from a
Doe Rules with the broader body of child welfare
33
33
disability perspective.
perspective. The law should intervene to protect infants
whose parents make choices
choices that fall below what society
society deems
acceptable
minimally acceptable.
acceptable. When there exists a range of acceptable
34
reasonable
call
might
law
tort
what
choices, though--or
tort law might call reasonable choices,
choices,34
31. When insufficiently
insufficiently bounded, this discretion
discretion generates
generates criticism
criticism that social workers and courts
courts
existence of abuse or neglect, judgments
exercise too much power to make judgments about
about the existence
judgments that
Decisionmaking: In
may be infected
infected by bias or false assumptions. See Marsha Garrison, Child Welfare Decisionmaking:
Search of the Least Drastic
DrasticAlternative,
Alternative, 75 GEO. L.J. 1745, 1759
(1987).
1759 (1987).
Search
32. Federal law recognizes as much, dictating
32.
dictating that state child welfare authorities should use
"[e]xcept
e]xcept with respect to the
discretion in exercising authority in cases involving medical decisions, "[
withholding of medically indicated treatments
conditions." 42
treatments from disabled infants with life threatening
threatening conditions."
U.S.C. § 5106i(b) (2006).
33. By making this point, I am not arguing that child welfare
welfare law is necessarily the optimal
optimal legal
framework for addressing the limits on parental decision making regarding marginally
framework
marginally viable or disabled
newborns.
newborns. My more limited point is that, to the extent that Congress has chosen
chosen this framework by
within---and
enacting the Baby Doe Rules,
Rules, it may be helpful to understand those Rules
Rules as existing within-and
cohering with-the larger framework. For an argument
cohering
argument that child neglect
neglect law is an inappropriate
inappropriate
framework for addressing issues regarding parents'
parents' medical decisions
decisions for their minor children, see
Health Care
Care
Parents Should Make Health
Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine When Parents
Decisionsfor
Deference Justified?,
Justified?, 73 TEMP.
for Their Children: Is Deference
TEMP. L. REv. 1 (2000). Although she rejects
Decisions
framework, Professor
the child neglect
neglect framework,
Professor Rosato agrees that a problem
problem with the Baby
Baby Doe Rules is that
they give
give insufficient
insufficient deference to parental
id. at 20-24.
they
parental decisions
decisions regarding
regarding newborns. See id.
Sayeed, supra
supra note 8, at 609
"allowing reasonable considerations
considerations
34. Cf Sayeed,
609 (suggesting the value
value of "allowing
other than the mere chance
chance at life to enter our ethical calculus").
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parents should be able to make decisions that accord with their own
own
values and their understanding
understanding of what is best for their infant and
their family.
by
This suggestion takes inspiration from the contribution
contribution by
disability scholar Adrienne Asch to the discussion regarding
regarding the
disability critique
critique of prenatal
prenatal testing for the purposes
purposes of permitting
pennitting
disability." While
abortion when testing reveals the fetus will have a disability.35
she decries prenatal testing practices
practices as "justified
''justified by mistaken
mistaken
assumptions about the quality of life of people with disabilities,
disabilities, and
disabilities, 36 Asch does not
are demeaning to existing people
people with disabilities,,,36
argue that pregnant
pregnant women should be prevented
prevented from using prenatal
testing. Instead, she advocates for changes in the rhetoric and
practices
order to facilitate "true
practices surrounding
surrounding prenatal testing in order
37
reproductive
choice
for
women."
She
asserts that for true
reproductive
women. ,,37
reproductive
reproductive choice to exist, prospective parents need to hear from
counselors
counselors about the full experience-both
experience-both the satisfactions and
challenges--of
challenges-of 38raising a child with the disability diagnosable by
prenatal testing.
testing. 38
Similarly, parents facing the birth of an extremely
extremely premature
newborn could be provided
provided not only with information
infonnation about the
developmental outcomes for an infant
various possible medical and developmental
information about the
who receives maximal treatment
treatment but also infonnation
impairments resulting
abilities retained by children having
having various impainnents
from prematurity
prematurity and whether and how those children can be
participants
community life. Of course, because so
participants in family and community
so
much is uncertain
at
birth
and
in
the
earliest
uncertain
days of these infants'
infants'
lives, this task may be more challenging
than
in
the
case
where
a
challenging
Nonetheless, parents who
specific disability is diagnosed prenatally. Nonetheless,
35. By
35.
By drawing this analogy, I do not mean to elide
elide the moral and legal relevance
relevance of birth. But both
prenatally
prenatally and postnatally, the interest in preventing the termination of life on grounds of disability or
or
potential
potential disability exists in tension with other, competing
competing interests. Prenatally, the competing
competing interest is
the woman's
woman's interest
interest in bodily
bodily integrity
integrity and reproductive
reproductive autonomy;
autonomy; postnatally,
postnatally, it is the interest of
of
parents
parents in family privacy and parental autonomy.
Prenatal Testing:
Testing: Contradictory
Contradictory or Compatible?
Compatible?, 30
36. Adrienne Asch, Disability
Disability Equality and Prenatal
30
FLA. ST.
ST. U. L. REv. 315, 318
318 (2003).
37. Id. at 317.
37.
38. Id. at 334-35.
334-35.
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are provided not only with medical
medical prognoses, but also with
information
information about the social experience of older children who were
born very prematurely, will be better able to make thoughtful and
informed
and
informed decisions about what is in the best interests of an infant and
parents'
seeks initially to support parents'
their family. An approach that seeks
ability to meet their parental
parental obligations
obligations is also consistent
consistent (at least in
theory) with the general
general approach of child welfare law. 39 Even under
this approach, some choices
acceptable
choices will fall below the minimally
minimally acceptable
threshold. For example, a refusal
refusal to provide life-saving surgery to
correct
correct a minor defect in an infant with Down syndrome
syndrome might well
4o
be judged to be medical neglect justifying
justifying state intervention.40
I recognize
recognize that, from a disability perspective,
perspective, adopting this
approach
approach is a risky proposition. The 2007 Policy Statement from the
American
Non-initiation or Withdrawal
Withdrawal of
of
American Academy
Academy of Pediatrics on Non-initiation
Intensive
Intensive Care for High-Risk Newborns
Newborns refers to "acceptable"
"acceptable" quality
of life and "unacceptable"
"unacceptable" quality of life for high-risk infants who
survive after receiving
recelvmg intensive treatment
treatment without once
once
acknowledging
acknowledging that these are loaded terms from a disability
41
perspective.
There remains good reason to believe
believe that some parents
perspective. 41
facing the bewildering
and
emotionally
volatile
situation presented
bewildering
presented by
an extremely premature birth may be influenced
influenced by medical
professionals
entertain misconceptions about
professionals who are biased or who entertain
educate parents, neonatologists,
living with disability. Efforts to educate
neonatologists,
nurses, and social workers regarding the joys and challenges
challenges
39. Cj
Cf. David 1.
J. Herring, Inclusion
Inclusion of the Reasonable
of
Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Termination
Termination of
Parental
Statutes: Punishing
Childfor the Failures
Child Welfare System.
System, 54 U.
Parental Rights Statutes:
Punishing the Childfor
Failures of the State Child
Prrr. 1.
L. REv. 139, 202-06 (1992)
(1992) (arguing that, while legislation
Pm.
legislation forcing child welfare
welfare agencies to
continue
efforts" to rehabilitate abusive
continue to make "reasonable efforts"
abusive or neglectful parents once the state has
has
decided
decided to seek termination of parental rights may cause harm to the child involved, agencies should be
required
required to make reasonable efforts in support of parent-child
parent-child reunification at earlier
earlier stages of child
protection
protection proceedings).
proceedings).
40. I1 should acknowledge that, in arguing for a broader realm of parental
parental autonomy than that
recognized
recognized by the Baby Doe Rules, this Essay does not confront
confront the remaining, tough question of what
parental
newborns-whether they are born extremely
prematurely or with disabilities
parental choices involving newborns-whether
extremely prematurely
like Down syndrome
syndrome or spina bifida-should
bifida--should be deemed
deemed under this approach not to meet the minimally
minimally
acceptable threshold and thus to constitute medical neglect.
41.
Noninitiationor
or Withdrawal
Withdrawal ofIntensive
Carefor
High-Risk
41. Committee
Committee on Fetus
Fetus and Newborn, Noninitiation
Intensive Care
for High-Risk
Newborns,
401I (2007).
(2007).
Newborns, 119 PEDIATRICS
PEOIATRIes 40
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experienced by parents whose children were born very prematurely,
of those children's quality of life, will need to
as well as self-reports
self-reports ofthose
be ongoing. And even with education, some parents will decide not to
resuscitate
because of their
their
resuscitate or provide continuing intensive care because
concern about what a potential disability, with its attendant
attendant psychic,
social, and financial costs, will mean for their family'S
family's lives. From a
disability perspective,
perspective, these decisions may be troubling.
To disable parents from exercising parental autonomy
autonomy on the
question of how to care for a marginally viable newborn, however,
may carry costs of its own. It diminishes respect for family integrity
integrity
and thus may itself be risky from the disability
disability perspective. Family
invaluable role in the flourishing of
of
support and advocacy can play an invaluable
persons
persons with disabilities, both individually
individually and collectively,
collectively, and so
so
parents
empowered to play a lead in decision making
parents should be empowered
throughout
of
throughout the process. To be sure, any assertion about the value of
family support
support and advocacy for persons
persons· with disabilities must be
accompanied
accompanied by the recognition that children
children and adults with
counterparts to be
disabilities are more likely than their non-disabled
non-disabled counterparts
the victims of family violence. Moreover, the constitutional
presumption that parents
parents will act in the best interests of their children
children
may be particularly
particularly weak
weak in the case of newborns, with whom parents
have not enjoyed the same opportunities for the bonding that
typically leads parents
parents to seek their children's
children's best interests. These
points reinforce the importance
importance of establishing
establishing some limits on
42
parents' medical choices for extremely premature newborns
parents'
newborns42
but do
of
not, to my mind, make desirable the Baby Doe Rules'
Rules' approach of
defining
medical
neglect
broadly
to
include
most
instances
of
nondefming medical neglect
aggressive
aggressive treatment
treatment for imperiled newborns. For all these reasons, I
people
would suggest that advocates
advocates for the rights and welfare
welfare of people
with disabilities should consider the value of supporting
supporting the

"full information
information about the
42. For example, John
10hn Robertson
Robertson suggests that only parents acting on ''full
conditions and prospects"
prospects" are entitled to deference
"parents' directions not to
child's conditions
deference and that, therefore, "parents'
resuscitate at birth should not be given effect
effect until a medical assessment
assessment of the child's condition and
made." Robertson,
prognosis justifying
justifying nontreatment has been
been made."
Robertson, supra note 3, at 38.
38.
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educated-and limited-exercise
limited--exercise of
of parental
parental autonomy
autonomy in cases
cases
educated-and
involving marginally
marginally viable
viable newborns.
involving
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